by responding extemporaneously to all 31 commentators, one panel at a time, and elaborating those initial thoughts in a published response. 6 One of us had the privilege of writing the biographical entry on Dworkin in the Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law, and closed that entry by stating: AHis work abounds with indefatigable energy, giving the impression that he will not stop making arguments until he has put the clamps of reason upon every rational being.@ 7 Dworkin=s famous Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy at New York University (with Tom Nagel and sometimes Jeremy Waldron) set the standard for rigorous, vigorous, and constructive dialogue concerning important scholarship in those fields. Many other colloquia have been modeled upon it, but none has equaled it. Dworkin, Nagel, and Waldron gave incisive summaries of the works being presented, asked apt questions, and pressed probing and constructive criticisms. The command and vigor with which they did so was an inspiration to all who presented work in the Colloquium and to all who participated. One of us (McClain) benefitted both from the formative experience of being a student in the Colloquium and, years later, from receiving the generous input of Dworkin and Nagel when presenting a paper in the Colloquium. 8 Dworkin=s work in legal philosophy and constitutional theory was so powerful and fecund that it could inspire many careers wholly dedicated to building upon it and working out its implications. Dworkin (along with John Rawls) has been a powerful inspiration for our own work in constitutional theory. Fleming=s Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy puts forward a AConstitution-perfecting theory@ that aims, in the spirit of Dworkin, to interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. 9 forget the thrill of engaging with him and building upon his work. His sparkling prose, the staggering ambition and monumental achievements of his works, and the flair and gusto of his arguments and insights will never cease to illuminate and inspire. We shall not look upon his like again. Ronald Dworkin made legal philosophy and constitutional theory the best they can be.
In this essay, we shall interpret Dworkin=s constitutional theory in light of three varieties of perfectionism: (1) the idea that government should undertake a formative project of inculcating civic virtues and encouraging responsibility in the exercise of rights; (2) the idea that we should interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be; and (3) the idea that we should defend a Constitution-perfecting theory that would secure not only procedural liberties essential for democratic self-government but also substantive liberties essential for personal self-government. We shall identify three gaps left by Dworkin=s work and sketch how we have sought to fill those gaps in the spirit of his work through developing a mild form of constitutional perfectionism.
II. Taking Not Only Rights But Also Responsibilities and Virtues Seriously
First, there is perfectionism in political philosophy as it might be applied to constitutional proper concern with cultivating civic virtues. 37 We too work on this terrain of civic liberalism in our book, Ordered Liberty. 38 We shall suggest that the convergences between Dworkin, on the one hand, and the civic liberals and civic republicans, on the other, are closer with respect to recognizing considerable latitude for governmental promotion of responsible exercise of rights than they are with respect to recognizing the need for governmental inculcation of civic virtues. That is, Dworkin developed a theory of taking not only rights but also responsibilities seriously, but he for the most part eschewed developing a perfectionist project of cultivating civic virtues.
B. Taking Responsibilities as well as Rights Seriously
In Life=s Dominion, Dworkin propounds a notably Amoralized@ liberalism, making moral arguments for the right to procreative autonomy and the right to die while defending the authority of government to moralize concerning persons= exercise of these rights. Second, critics and allies commonly associate Dworkin with the notion of Arights as trumps@ and thus with the idea that Ataking rights seriously@ practically precludes reconciling rights with, or balancing rights against, governmental concern for the guarding the public moral space. 41 tradition. Yet Dworkin is right to see that the risks of this tradition do not justify rejecting it entirely. Instead, he attempts to work with, and to work within, this tradition and to make it safe for liberals and for fundamental principles of freedom and equality, together with commitments to equal concern and dignity.
In Justice for Hedgehogs, in a passage concerning restricting liberty, Dworkin asks:
AWhy should [the majority] not be permitted to protect the religious and sexual culture it favors...?@ He answers:
We need arguments like those of this book B the distinctions and interconnections among responsibility, authenticity, influence, and subordination that we have reviewed B properly to answer that question. The second principle of dignity makes ethics special: it limits the acceptable range of collective decision. We cannot escape the influence of our ethical environment: we are subject to the examples, exhortations, and celebrations of other people=s ideas about how to live. But we must insist that that environment be created under the aegis of ethical independence: that it be created organically by the decisions of millions of people with the freedom to make their own choices, not through political majorities imposing their decisions on everyone. 43 There clearly will be limits on government=s protection of the ethical environment.
Dworkin=s arguments for rights in both Life=s Dominion and Justice for Hedgehogs are grounded, not in governmental neutrality or in personal autonomy, but in a deontology of state conduct. In other words, Dworkin advances a theory that derives from a conception of the permissible bases for collective decisions. His concern is with respecting limits on the grounds for governmental decisions and with avoiding political majorities imposing their decisions on everyone concerning questions such as how to live or how best to respect the sanctity of life. 44 Dworkin specifically denied that he was articulating a theory of rights that asks what our fundamental or especially important interests are and what freedoms are necessary to secure or further those interests. 45 
III. Making the Moral Reading of the American Constitution the Best It Can Be

A. Interpretive Perfectionism
Second, we distinguish perfectionism in the sense of a theory of constitutional interpretation entailing that we should interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. 48 On this view, as Sunstein puts it, constitutional interpretation is a matter of putting the existing legal materials "in their best constructive light," or of making them "the best they can be." 49 Furthermore, it is the quest for the interpretation that provides the best fit with and justification of the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order. 50 This sense of perfectionism B which we might call "interpretive perfectionism" B is famously associated with Dworkin. We embrace this sense.
Dworkin=s interpretive perfectionism takes the form of the "moral reading" of the American Constitution: the Constitution embodies abstract moral principles rather than laying down particular historical conceptions, and interpreting and applying those principles require fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood. 51 Dworkin=s development of the moral reading makes it sound (1) more utopian and (2) more philosophical than it should. Therefore, he triggers objections that he propounds (1) a theory of the "perfect Constitution" 52 and (2) a theory that entails that judges should be philosophers. 53 To be fair to Dworkin, he does not claim that the moral reading is a moral realist reading: a reading that is prior to and independent of our own political and constitutional order and practice, and true to the moral order of the universe. 54 Rather, he contends that the moral reading is constrained by the requirements of fit and integrity: thus, it is bound to account for the legal materials of the existing constitutional order and practice. 55 And so, even if Dworkin=s theory of constitutional interpretation aims to provide the best interpretation of these legal materials B to make the Constitution the best it can be B it is not unbounded.
Nonetheless, some critics charge that Dworkin=s moral reading is utopian in two senses.
One, it is a moral reading for a perfect liberal utopia: he would interpret the American Constitution to protect every right and produce every outcome that his liberal political philosophy would entail. And two, it is literally a theory for no place: he would give the same moral reading irrespective of the actual history and practice of the constitutional scheme, for example, the same for Britain as for the United States. We do not believe that such critics are right about Dworkin=s moral reading, but they certainly are persistent and warrant a fuller response than simply directing them to read Dworkin more carefully.
When confronted with the "perfect Constitution" challenge, 56 Dworkin basically pleaded (we paraphrase): "I do not believe the American Constitution is perfect. For example, while I do believe that justice requires welfare rights, I do not believe that the Constitution protects such rights." To continue our paraphrase: "Your challenge applies to Frank Michelman B not me B because he B not I B believes that the Constitution does protect welfare rights." 57 Beyond that, Dworkin was at pains to make clear, as noted above, that the constraints of fit and integrity entail that the actual Constitution is imperfect when measured against the standards of any normative political philosophy or conception of justice.
Our tack here for responding to the perfect Constitution challenge to Dworkin=s moral reading is to show how Lawrence G. Sager=s justice-seeking account of American constitutional practice helps meet the challenge, in particular, through its accounts of the thinness of constitutional justice and more particularly of the moral shortfall of judicially enforceable constitutional law. Sager argues that certain constitutional principles required by justice are judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may impose affirmative obligations outside the courts on legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to realize them more fully. 58 Sager=s view is an important component of a full moral reading or justice-seeking account of the Constitution. For it helps make sense of the evident thinness or moral shortfall of constitutional law. For example, instead of saying that the American Constitution does not secure welfare rights B the move that Dworkin makes B Sager says that the Constitution does secure welfare rights, but it leaves their enforcement in the first instance to legislatures and executives. 59 Once a scheme of welfare rights and benefits is in place, courts have a secondary role in enforcing it equally and fairly. the Constitution is abstract, and therefore it should come as no surprise that any right we can argue for as a matter of political morality we can also argue for as a matter of constitutional law. 61 And where he does acknowledge a significant gap between the Constitution and justice, for example, with welfare rights, he does not provide a general account of why the Constitution as he conceives it does not incorporate elements of justice like welfare rights.
Sager=s account of the domain of constitutional justice helps in this regard. He distinguishes (1) judicially enforceable constitutional law from (2) constitutional justice, which he in turn distinguishes from (3) political justice and (4) morality generally. 62 Imagine a series of progressively thicker concentric circles representing these four domains. Dworkin=s highly general formulation of the "moral reading" may seem to blur the distinction between constitutional law and constitutional justice, as well as that between constitutional justice and political justice, and indeed that between constitutional law, on the one hand, and political justice and morality generally, on the other. His "hedgehogist" commitment to the integration of ethics, morality, and justice may further blur those distinctions. Sager=s justice-seeking account underscores just how thin a moral reading of the Constitution has to be B as compared to our thicker conceptions of political justice and morality B in order to be credible as an account of American constitutional practice.
Sager=s underenforcement thesis may entail a conception of legislative responsibility congenial to the conception that Dworkin=s early work promised but never fully provided. We refer to the "doctrine of political responsibility" that Dworkin argued (in "Hard Cases") is incumbent on legislatures as well as courts. 63 The doctrine of political responsibility implies that legislatures have an obligation to engage in coherent, responsible legislating with integrity (not precisely as coherent, responsible, and constrained as judging with integrity, but legislating with integrity nonetheless 72 Dworkin is persuasive in contending that protection of, and respect for, rights that are the conditions for moral membership in our political community B rooted in equal concern and dignity B are themselves preconditions for the legitimacy of the outcomes of majoritarian political processes. 73 Here
Dworkin B despite his criticism of Ely B appears to have taken a page out of Ely=s book in conceiving our rights as Ademocratic conditions@ and in arguing that courts protecting constitutional rights guarantee democracy rather than compromise it. But unlike Ely, Dworkin would include, among the conditions of democracy, certain Asubstantive@ rights rooted in equal concern and dignity in addition to Aprocedural@ rights. 74 Dworkin has powerfully expressed the conditions of moral membership in our political community. But we would recast the architecture of his constitutional theory to differentiate it more sharply from that of Ely=s process-perfecting theory. Characterizing all of our substantive and procedural rights as Ademocratic conditions,@ as Dworkin does, may lead to unnecessary trouble and resistance. Many readers may resist his argument that substantive rights grounded in equal concern and dignity are Ademocratic conditions.@ They may suspect that Dworkin is pulling a fast one or being too clever by packing all of the substantive rights that constrain majoritarian political processes into the Ademocratic conditions.@ 75 One of us has sought to develop a substantive Constitution-perfecting theory as an alternative to the process-perfecting theory advanced by Ely. 76 Through offering this account of the moral shortfall of the moral reading and developing a substantive Constitution-perfecting theory, we aspire to make the moral reading of the American Constitution the best it can be.
